School Law - The Fifth Circuit Prolongs Educational Inequalities in United States v. Texas by Hedman, Cristin Lee
SMU Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 2 Article 12
2011
School Law - The Fifth Circuit Prolongs
Educational Inequalities in United States v. Texas
Cristin Lee Hedman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cristin Lee Hedman, School Law - The Fifth Circuit Prolongs Educational Inequalities in United States v. Texas, 64 SMU L. Rev. 779
(2011)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol64/iss2/12
SCHOOL LAW-THE FIFrH CIRCUIT
PROLONGS EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITIES
IN UNITED STATES V. TEXAS
Cristin Lee Hedman*
HE Fifth Circuit's 2010 decision in United States v. Texas, a case
with a forty-year history,' represents an unfortunate failure of the
defendants, the State of Texas and the Texas Education Agency
(TEA), to provide equivalent educational opportunities to students with
diverse backgrounds. The court incorrectly held, despite data indicating
defendants' substandard monitoring of Limited English Proficient (LEP)
programs and poor academic performance by LEP students, that insuffi-
cient evidence existed to show that defendants had violated the Equal
Educational Opportunity Act (EEOA).2 This decision was erroneous for
several reasons. First, the Fifth Circuit mistakenly concluded that the
trial court's analysis of the EEOA claim should have necessarily included
an assessment of individual school districts. Second, the Fifth Circuit in-
correctly determined that the trial court abused its discretion in relying
on student data offered by the plaintiffs. Finally, equity and policy con-
cerns weigh in favor of the plaintiffs prevailing here. For these reasons,
the Fifth Circuit's decision as to the plaintiffs' EEOA claim should be
overturned.
In Texas, although school districts primarily ensure compliance with
state and local educational laws, the Texas Education Code (Code) re-
quires the TEA, along with districts, to share responsibility for educating
students. 3 In particular, the TEA must "'administer and monitor compli-
ance"' with educational programs that federal or state laws require. 4 Two
such initiatives are Texas's bilingual and English as a Second Language
(ESL) programs. 5 The Code requires all Texas school districts to offer
these programs for grade levels in which twenty or more students are
* J.D. Candidate 2012, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; B.A.
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1. Although the most recent holding in United States v. Texas follows a complex fac-
tual and procedural record that extends from the desegregation era into the present day,
only that history most germane to this analysis is reviewed herein. See United States v.
Texas, 601 F.3d 354, 357-60 (5th Cir. 2010).
2. See id. at 375.
3. See id. at 360.
4. Id. (quoting TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.021(b) (West 2006)).
5. See id.
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classified as LEP, which indicates that a student speaks a primary lan-
guage other than English.6 Mandated from kindergarten through fifth
grade and permitted in grades six through eight, bilingual programs in-
volve instruction in English and a student's home language.7 Conversely,
ESL programs are required in grades nine through twelve and involve
modified English instruction. 8 Under the state's Performance Based
Monitoring Analysis System (PBMAS) implemented in 2003, the TEA
was to evaluate bilingual and ESL programs based on several indicators,
including the "TAKS scores of LEP students, . . . the LEP annual drop-
out rate, the LEP graduation rate, and LEP reading proficiency." 9
Subsequent to the PBMAS implementation, several data sets were col-
lected on bilingual and ESL programs that eventually led the Fifth Circuit
to acknowledge the following conclusions about the state's monitoring of
these programs: 10
[S]ome school districts are likely under-reporting the number of
LEP students, and TEA has done nothing to verify these num-
bers .... TEA has no procedure for comparing the performance of
LEP students to non-LEP students directly.... PBMAS's aggrega-
tion of scores for multiple grade levels as well as for entire school
districts distorted the performance indicators and masked problems
at specific schools.
* [Additionally,] TEA had not conducted any on-site monitoring
for some years and had no bilingual-ESL certified monitors at the
time of the trial.... No Child Left Behind ... and the Texas account-
ability rating system. . . . do not overcome the deficiencies in
PBMAS.11
Further, contemporaneous data on secondary LEP students indicated
that they were performing poorly compared to the general student popu-
lation.1 2 LEP students maintained substantially lower passage rates on
TAKS and other standardized tests, were retained more often, dropped
out at a higher rate, and generally failed to make progress in or exit from
LEP programs within a reasonable time.1 3
In light of these events, in 2006 the United States, the League of
United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), and G.I. Forum (collectively,
6. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 29.051-29.053 (West 2006); see also United States
v. Texas, 572 F. Supp. 2d 726, 735 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 29.053(c)), rev'd, 601 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2010).
7. See United States v. Texas, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 735-36 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. §§ 29.053(d), 29.055(a)-(b) (West 2006)).
8. See id.
9. United States v. Texas, 601 F.3d at 360-61. The Texas Assessment of Knowledge
and Skills (TAKS), is Texas's mandated standardized test; the state is currently transition-
ing to a new standardized testing format, the State of Texas Assessments of Academic
Readiness (STAAR). Press Release, Texas Education Agency, STAAR to Replace TAKS
(Jan. 26, 2010).






hereinafter "intervenors") filed a claim, inter alia, under § 1703(f) of the
EEOA. 14 This provision prohibits states from denying opportunities to
students by failing "to take appropriate action to overcome language bar-
riers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional
programs. ' 15 Defendants consisted of the State of Texas, the TEA, and
the Texas Commissioner of Education.1 6 Specifically, intervenors argued
that the TEA had "abandoned monitoring, enforcing, and supervising
school districts to ensure compliance with Texas's bilingual education
program" and had "failed to provide equal educational opportunity to
LEP students above the elementary level."' 17 Upon intervenors' motion
for relief under the EEOA, the district court ultimately found a statutory
violation and "order[ed] defendants to 'establish a new monitoring sys-
tem and establish a language program"' to meet the statute's require-
ments.18 Defendants then appealed to the Fifth Circuit.19
With respect to intervenors' EEOA claim, the Fifth Circuit held that
the Eastern District had abused its discretion in finding a § 1703(f) viola-
tion "because the evidence presented d[id] not establish that a student's
right ha[d] been violated or that defendants' acts or omissions [had]
caused any claimed violation."'20 The Fifth Circuit hinged its conclusion
on two key grounds.21 First, it found the district court's decision "unrelia-
ble" because the lower court based its conclusion on claims that did not
include individual school districts as parties.2 2 Second, the circuit court
reasoned that the lower court's decision was in error because the record
did not show that defendants had failed to take "'appropriate action"'
required by § 1703(f). 23
As a rationale for its first key argument, the circuit court reasoned that
the intervenors' issues could not be addressed properly without including
individual school districts in the suit.24 The Fifth Circuit asserted that
"'there exists little if any practical or logical justification for attempting to
deal on a statewide basis with the problems presented by this case." 25
Addressing its second main argument, the circuit court determined that
the evidence was insufficient to show that defendants had failed to act
appropriately.26 Foremost, the Fifth Circuit relied in part on the Supreme
Court's decision in Home v. Flores and noted that, of the three elements
necessary to establish an EEOA violation, only the question of whether a
14. See id. at 357-58.
15. Equal Educational Opportunity Act (EEOA), 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2006).
16. United States v. Texas, 601 F.3d at 357.
17. United States v. Texas, 572 F. Supp. 2d 726, 732-33 (E.D. Tex. 2008), rev'd, 601
F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2010).
18. United States v. Texas, 601 F.3d at 359.
19. See id. at 359.
20. Id. at 375.
21. See id. at 364-65.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 365 (quoting Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2605 (2009)).
24. Id. at 364.
25. Id. (quoting United States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1982)).
26. Id. at 365.
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"violation 'stem[med] from a failure to take "appropriate action"' on the
part of the defendants," was at issue in the case at bar.27 The Fifth Circuit
briefly mentioned the Seventh Circuit's stance on this subject, but drew
no conclusions from it.28 Next, the court applied the three-prong Cas-
taneda v. Pickard test to determine whether an educational agency's ac-
tion is appropriate. 2 9 Under this test, a court must determine "(1)
whether the program is based on sound educational theory, (2) whether
reasonable efforts are being made to implement the theory (implementa-
tion prong), and (3) whether the program, over a legitimate period of
time, has achieved some success in overcoming language barriers (results
prong). '30 Because the district court found violations solely based on the
latter two prongs, the Fifth Circuit only considered those factors.3 1
Applying the body of law regarding "appropriate action," the Fifth Cir-
cuit analyzed the defendants' implementation of the PBMAS and the re-
sults produced by that system. 32 Addressing the implementation prong
first, the circuit court assessed "whether defendants ha[d] made a 'bona
fide effort[ ] to make the program work" 33 and found that the evidence
was insufficient to show that they had not.34 The circuit court found that
the TEA's failure to provide LEP to non-LEP comparisons did not sub-
stantiate a finding of a violation because the EEOA does not mandate
equalized results. 35 Also, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the alleged
under-identification of LEP students was erroneously based on the dis-
trict court's belief that parental denials from bilingual and ESL programs
changed student LEP identification status. 36 Further, the circuit court as-
serted that the trial court erred by relying on a study revealing the sub-
standard campus-level performance of nearly 55,000 LEP students
because the study was incomplete and did not provide necessary inter-
vention data.37
Next, the Fifth Circuit turned to the results prong, under which it as-
sessed "whether defendants' program... '[failed] to produce results indi-
cating that the language barriers confronting students [weire actually
being overcome." 38 The circuit court found that the lower court over-
emphasized standardized test scores, relied on PBMAS data over a two-
year period that constituted an insufficient trial time, and ultimately erred
in recognizing a causative relationship between defendants' acts and sec-
27. Id. at 365-66 (alteration in original) (quoting Home, 129 S. Ct. at 2605).
28. See id. at 365-66 & n.ll (citing Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030,
1042-43 (7th Cir. 1987)).
29. See id. at 366 (citing Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 1981)).
30. Id.
31. See id. at 366-73.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 367 (second alteration in original) (quoting Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1010).
34. See id. at 373.
35. See id. at 367.
36. Id. at 368.
37. Id. at 369.
38. Id. at 370 (first alteration in original) (quoting Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1010).
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ondary LEP students' failures. 39 Because the Fifth Circuit found that in-
tervenors failed to provide the requisite evidence to substantiate their
§ 1703(f) claim, the circuit court held that the district court abused its
discretion on this issue. 40
In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Texas
erred on several grounds, each of which warrants a reversal of this opin-
ion. First, the circuit court mistakenly determined that the EEOA claim
could only be analyzed if individual districts were parties to the suit. The
plain language of § 1703(f) makes no mention of individual districts;
rather, the statute explicitly mandates that "[n]o State shall deny equal
educational opportunity. '41 As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Castaneda,
interpretation of the EEOA "should 'adhere closely to the ordinary
meaning of the [statute's] language"' since it has virtually "no legislative
history."' 42 Further, although the state and its educational agency may
share responsibility for educating Texas students, mandatory inclusion of
individual districts as parties to an EEOA claim presumes that the educa-
tional inequalities the statute was meant to guard against must stem from
a local level. This unnecessary relegation of § 1703(f) to the district realm
diminishes defendants' roles in what the Supreme Court has declared to
be an "area[ ] of core state responsibility" 43 and contravenes the flexibil-
ity envisioned by the higher Court.44 In addition, other circuits diverge
from the Fifth Circuit on this issue.45 For these reasons, the district court
acted within its discretion by analyzing the EEOA claim despite the fact
that individual districts were not party to the suit.
Second, the Fifth Circuit incorrectly determined that the trial court
abused its discretion in relying on evidence that defendants had failed to
take "appropriate action" to overcome language barriers. Based on the
Castaneda implementation prong, the district court acted within its dis-
cretion in concluding that defendants had violated the EEOA. Contrary
to the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, the intervenors' desire for direct LEP ver-
sus non-LEP comparisons in standardized tests was not tantamount to an
expectation of equal results; the state need not ensure equal outcomes in
providing needed comparison data where none exists. Further, the circuit
court mistakenly appraised the district court's scrutiny of under-identified
39. See id. at 370-72.
40. Id. at 375.
41. Equal Educational Opportunity Act (EEOA), 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2006) (emphasis
added); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
42. United States v. Texas, 572 F. Supp. 2d 726, 757 (E.D. Tex 2008) (alteration in
original) (quoting Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1001), rev'd, 601 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2010).
43. Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593 (2009).
44. See id. at 2594-95.
45. See, e.g., Gomez v. I1. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1042-43 (7th Cir. 1987)
("The defendants maintain that the Castaneda decision applies only to local school dis-
tricts. We disagree. There is certainly no language in that case to suggest that it is so lim-
ited .... Section 1703(f) could hardly be called detailed, but it does make clear, through the
definition of the term 'educational agency,' that the obligation to take 'appropriate action'




LEP students. The lower court pointed out that the percentage of paren-
tal denials from bilingual and ESL programs was likely much lower in
reality than the percentages reported by districts.46 This indicated that
LEP students were not receiving assistance through required programs
that their parents may well have supported participation in. Thus, the
district court could have concluded, as it did, that defendants failed to
properly monitor LEP programs when they took no action to verify the
numbers.47 Further, on the issue of data aggregation, the Fifth Circuit
incorrectly dismissed the trial court's reliance on the study of nearly
55,000 LEP students' inferior academic performance at the campus level.
The study had value in that it showed LEP student failures across cam-
puses, a level on which defendants' system masked data. Importantly, the
body of evidence against defendants here greatly outweighed the evi-
dence presented against similar defendants in the Seventh Circuit.48 That
court has found that a state's failure to ensure identification and place-
ment of LEP students alone may constitute a lack of implementation
under the Castaneda test.49 In sum, the lack of LEP to non-LEP compar-
isons, the under-identification of LEP students and under-provision to
them of mandated programs, and the aggregation of data leading to
masked failures all indicate that defendants were merely "go[ing] through
the motions of solving the problem of language barriers" 50 instead of im-
plementing an appropriate monitoring system and language program.
In addition, the Fifth Circuit erred in finding that the lower court
abused its discretion as to the results prong of the Castaneda test. Inter-
venors' numerous data sets regarding secondary students-including
lower performance on TAKS tests relative to the general student popula-
tion, higher retention and drop-out rates, and general failure to progress
reasonably through programs-indicated, as the Fifth Circuit stated, an
"alarming" situation that spanned several years. 51 Further, the circuit
court misconstrued the trial court's assessment of causation as to these
results. Unlike the Fifth Circuit, which implied that only the defendants'
overt actions could constitute a violation,52 the lower court held that de-
fendants "ha[d] not met their obligation to overcome language barriers. '53
Moreover, although a court owes deference to the Texas school system as
the latter attempts to produce results, such compliance is not ironclad.
As Seventh Circuit courts have noted, "'judicial deference ... is unwar-
ranted if over a certain period the system has failed to make substantial
46. See United States v. Texas, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 767.
47. See id. at 767-68.
48. See Gomez, 811 F.2d at 1032-33.
49. See id. at 1033, 1042-43.
50. Id. at 1043.
51. United States v. Texas, 601 F.3d 354, 370 (5th Cir. 2010).
52. See id. at 370-73.
53. United States v. Texas, 572 F. Supp. 2d 726, 779 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (emphasis ad-
ded), rev'd, 601 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2010).
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progress in correcting the language deficiencies of its students."' 54
Clearly, the progress made here was insubstantial. Thus, defendants
failed not only to faithfully implement the monitoring program as to LEP
students but also to produce results indicating minimal progress under
that program. Therefore, the trial court was justified in finding that de-
fendants did not take "appropriate action" as required by the EEOA.
Finally, both equity and policy concerns support a reversal of the Fifth
Circuit's decision. In terms of equity, many of the student plaintiffs here
continue to show a poor record of academic performance, evidenced, as
both courts involved in this decision recognize, by many indicators.
Plaintiffs have sought relief in various forms through the intervening par-
ties for the better part of four decades.55 Yet the Fifth Circuit continues
to deny relief, to overlook defendants' finger-pointing and buck-passing,
and to allow the educational inequalities revealed in this case to continue.
Also, this decision is simply bad policy. It offers states an incentive to
create muddled monitoring systems and to hide behind the lackluster
data produced by those systems in order to avoid facing consequences
that rightly should be imposed under federal law. Meanwhile, without
appropriate state action, students in need of help will continue to fail.
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Texas improperly determined that
the trial court abused its discretion. The State of Texas and the TEA
failed to fulfill their obligation under § 1703(f) to overcome language ob-
stacles faced by LEP students. Overwhelming data indicated that defend-
ants did not implement an appropriate system to monitor LEP programs.
Moreover, the available test scores and completion data pointed towards
the defendants' contemporaneous failure to produce even minimal re-
sults. For these reasons, the district court was correct in finding a
§ 1703(f) violation, and the Fifth Circuit's decision regarding the inter-
venors' EEOA claim should be overturned.
54. Cortez v. Calumet Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 132, No. 01-C-8201, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18848, at *20 (N.D. I11. Sept. 27, 2002) (quoting Gomez, 811 F.2d at 1042).
55. See United States v. Texas, 601 F.3d at 357-60.
2011]
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